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Tuesday, May 11, 2010

bp

I was getting pretty worked up over the past weekend about the attitude and corporate cultural behavior exhibited by bp.  Nothing new, I've witnessed it many times in the past, but to see this behavior as being so ingrained, so culturally pervasive still coming to the forefront, still being the driver of decisions both in the forefront and in the background of the events that have played out since April 20th 2010, had me in a fit of outrage.

My intention was to post about this topic on Sunday, but after two hard days on the bike, I was a bit low on energy, so to speak.   And, indeed the European bank bailout started drawing my short-term attention away from the blowout over the weekend.  Now that the congressional hearings are scheduled for today, whereby you will witness first hand, from the mouths of the company leaders exactly what I am going to describe in the following few snippets.

It is all an incremental financial calculation, everything that bp does.  It is in their culture.  It is not about beyond petroleum, it is not about safety, it in not about the environment.  The business of business is to make money, that goes without saying, but at what level of risk?  What level of supervision and oversight?  Ring fencing the blame and finger pointing is about to be displayed in all its gory detail on your television screens in front of some congressional panel today.

First, let's be clear - the bottom line - this is bp's responsibility, full stop.

bp leased acreage from the USG in deepwater with the intention to make money.  No one put them up to this.  It is their business.  So, when it all goes horribly wrong, how can this all of a sudden be a blame game?  If it was not for bp leasing this acreage and drilling a hole into this reservoir, none of this would have happened.  There is only one ultimately responsible entity and that is bp.

Hayward heard about the blowout at breakfast in London on April 21, about four hours after it began. He said his first reaction was “unprintable.” For the first few days, he kept a low profile. BP judged that Transocean, the owner of the drill rig, should take the lead. Later Hayward deferred to U.S. government agencies such as the Coast Guard.


In early May, BP changed strategies and put Hayward in front of the cameras. The company hired Marine Spill Response to deploy four 210-foot oil-skimming ships and two planes to spray dispersants on the oil. As the crisis mounted, Hayward tried everything at once. 
The first comment I heard from Hayward was something to the effect that bp takes responsibility for the oil spill, but it was Transocean's equipment that failed.  Well, Transocean says that it was the Cameron BOP that did not work when needed - the last line of defense.  Cameron says, it worked when we delivered the BOP to Transocean in 2001, has Transocean modified it without our approval?  Or was it Halliburton's "fault"  they were contracted to do the casing cementing job that may have failed.

bp designed the well construction plan.  bp's company man was onboard directing and approving every critical step of the well construction operations.

bp can try to shed blame to their contractors and subcontractors, but the bottom line, as we all know in this industry, is that the operator is the essential link in the HSE chain and clearly that chain was broken.
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You can't make this stuff up....A special visit by bp officials to the Deepwater Horizon was underway with a celebration literally taking place at the time of the blowout.  The celebration - 7 years of safe operations.

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And here is a truly harrowing tale -

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/08/us/08rig.html?pagewanted=1&ref=todayspaper

So these rig hands who survived an unbelievable nightmare, taking a long boat ride to shore and are immediately forced to sign waivers, and all kind of rights away including not to talk to anyone about what happened.  Incredible.

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bp - Texas City Refinery, Alaska oil pipeline leak due to ignored maintenance, Macondo well blowout...

...and if that is not enough, check this out -

http://www.truthout.org/slick-operator-the-bp-ive-known-too-well59178

Apparently, Oil Spill Recovery systems work on the same principal as the fractional reserve banking system - it ain't there when you really need it...

Complicit in the Valdez spill?  Perhaps, not so directly, but the following article sheds light on the bp culture.

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On the hesitance of bp's Tony Hayward to swing into action since it was "not our equipment" - asshat.

In terms of the 52 yo's tenure at the top of bp, yeah right - Hayward is toast.

4 comments:

  1. How do you see this playing out? You mentioned about 2-3 months to drill the relief site. I read recently that there are currently about 3500 active wells in Gulf product.

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  4. 3500 active wells in the GOM is NOT an issue - those are producing/development wells - they are providing the fuel that goes into our cars and planes and heating systems, etc...

    the issue is with an exploration well. in an exploration well you are searching for a new reservoir and can be surprised by what you find during drilling - first time into that geological structure - 25,000 ft below the seafloor!

    once a discovery is made with an exploration well, then many development wells are drilled into the same, now known geological formation and this is a much safer situation

    ....although,

    shit still happens

    for example, if one were trying to drill into a new deeper formation from an existing production platform

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