Pages

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Vampire Squid Alert

Goldman Sachs Credit Default Swaps are blowing out.  Indicating that GS is more risky than Citi!



Interesting.  I guess Matt Taibbi's relentless chronicling of GS has shamed the authorities into action.  Are we gonna finally see some perp walks as fall out from the financial crisis (of 2007-2008)?  Could not happen to a nicer bunch of white shoe criminals.

Monday, May 30, 2011

What a Motorsports Weekend

Formula 1 Grand Prix de Monaco...and, they're off...


















Catching Seb up as his tires go off, can't believe they went for a one stop strategy, especially after China - no way he can make it to the end...















Then, late in the race, coming up on the group racing for fifth to tenth places, it all goes wrong, but, the three leaders are able to weave their way through the chaos and carry on unscathed.  However, the race is red flagged, and they are allowed to service the cars during the red flag stoppage.  Seb get's the gift of new tires, and the rest is history.



















Monaco is a beautiful setting, but I usually find the race to be relatively uninteresting, other than the tunnel-chicane complex, however, this year's race was absolutely thrilling.  And, my man, Sebastian Vettel hangs on for the win.  Nothing makes you luckier than winning.

...On to Indianapolis and another exciting race.

The front row introduced to the crowd before the start - Tagliani, Dixon and Servia.  JR qualified in 12th, Wheldon in 6th.,




















And, they're off...


















JR Hildebrand working his way into the lead, while others are conserving fuel, he's got enough to make it to the end.


















The 23 YO rookie has the Indy 500 in hand, one final turn to go for the win...err...you are coming up pretty fast on a slower car there JR, no, no don't go on the outside dude, it's all marbles...






Dan Wheldon is gifted the 2011 Indy 500.  It's never over until it's over.

And then, there's this, NASCAR Coca Cola 600 at Charolette, the longest race of the year.  Is Jr gonna get his game back on after 3 years?...I guess you might as well go for it....



runnin' on empty...oh well, Harvick will take it!

Three exciting and entertaining races, god bless the DVR and my comfy chair.

Sunday, May 29, 2011

Weekend at Bernie's

...the kid is a crack up...



...from the first remake...



...and +4,000,000 hits on youtube...



...I think both of the boys have been here...Alex first, in ~1995...in Bourne, TX (pronounced "berney")...wish I had a video of that one...I also hear tale that Matt does a mean Bernie...

Saturday, May 28, 2011

Swiss lab director confirms meeting Bruyneel and Armstrong over "suspect" samples


By: 

Hedwig Kröner

Published: 

May 27, 10:04, 

Updated: 

May 27, 10:35

Edition:

First Edition Cycling News, Friday, May 27, 2011

Armstrong defence attorney denies
Martial Saugy, the current director of the renowned Swiss Anti-Doping laboratory in Lausanne, has confirmed that four of the urine samples taken at the 2001 Tour de Suisse were labeled "suspect" and that he later met with former US Postal sports director Johan Bruyneel and Lance Armstrong to discuss details of the early EPO test method. It is the first time Saugy has reacted publicly to last week's accusations made by Tyler Hamilton, according to which the UCI and the Swiss laboratory covered up "suspect" samples of the seven-time Tour de France winner.
Saugy, who was the lab's scientific director at the time, told Swiss newspaper Neue Züricher Zeitung that he remembered four "suspect" samples from the 2001 Tour de Suisse but did not know whether they belonged to Armstrong.
"They were taken at four different stages, so I don't know whether they were from four different riders or all of the same athlete," said Saugy. "But the tests were not covered up, and it is also not correct that they could have been interpreted as positive. They were suspect, and you wouldn't stand a chance at all with that sole argument in front of a court."
It was during the 2001 season that the first anti-doping test for EPO was introduced, and the scientific community was still arguing on the validity of the test. "The Paris laboratory of Chatenay-Malabry fixed the criteria for a positive test result," he continued. "An athlete was positive only if 80 percent of the signs typical for the use of synthetic EPO were found."
A sample was considered "suspect" when "it showed between 70 and 80 percent of the typical EPO parameters. That meant that the probability of doping was high. But because such a result can also be produced naturally, it was all about excluding false positives."
In 2002, the Paris laboratory finally determined a threshold of 85 percent for a positive test result for EPO. It was during the course of that year that Saugy met with the US Postal team management, "who wanted to know what it meant when I pointed at suspect samples. Shortly before that I had heard that there was suspicion about the 2001 samples being linked to Armstrong."
However, Saugy said that the meeting did not take place at the Swiss lab - as stated by Hamilton in the 60 Minutes TV show - but during a trip made to collect blood samples. "And it also wasn't about discussing a particular result or to cover up anything. I explained how the EPO test worked and why there were suspect samples as well as positive ones. This information was part of a lecture that I had been giving in various locations."
Armstrong's attorney Tim Herman, however, recently said in a statement that "neither Armstrong or Bruyneel have any recollection of meeting [Saugy] for any purpose at any time," and "Armstrong was never informed by anyone in 2001 or any other time about either a positive or 'suspicious' test".
Saugy has been cooperating with federal investigators, as well as with WADA and the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency since September last year, according to the Washington Post. He is currently working to provide details about the "suspect" samples from 2001 to anti-doping authorities.

Friday, May 27, 2011

from Mises Daily - The Lehman Plan


by Mark Thornton on May 25, 2011

People often ask me, "What do you think the government should do instead of QE inflation?" My stock answer is that the government should not try to fight the depression with government spending and cheap credit. Trying to stop the market from correcting the errors of the past only delays the consequences and makes them much worse.

Government should balance its budget. There should be no new credit expansion by the Federal Reserve. Most importantly, government should not meddle in markets to try to soften the consequences of the correction. Specifically, that means no bailouts, stimulus packages, or new public-works projects. Do not prop up wages. Allow competition to lower the prices of land, labor, and capital. The only positive steps for government to take are implementing tax cuts and spending cuts, eliminating regulations, and allowing free trade.
Now, I have a name for this policy. It's called the "Lehman Bros. plan," after Lehman Brothers, the large financial firm on Wall Street that was allowed to go bankrupt in September 2008. This plan relies on allowing big firms to fail. Had this policy been followed from the beginning, I have little doubt that the crisis would already be over and we would not have added to the debt problem.

Henry Lehman got started in business in 1844 with a dry-goods store in Montgomery, Alabama. After his two brothers joined him a few years later, they named the business Lehman Brothers. They accepted raw cotton in exchange for their goods. This increased the volume of their business because people had more cotton than money, and it increased their profit margin because they made money selling the goods, and then they made more money selling the cotton. They later opened an office in New York and helped start the New York Cotton Exchange in 1870. Later, they joined the New York Stock Exchange and helped take companies such as Sears, Macy's, B.F. Goodrich, Woolworth's, and Studebaker public by selling their initial public stock offering. It was a great American success story from Dixie.

Unfortunately, in the beginning of the 21st century, Lehman Brothers was heavily involved in the subprime-mortgage market, and even though they quickly exited the market for new junk, they still held vast quantities of the lower-quality, higher-risk securities on their books. They got left holding the bag. They went into bankruptcy, where their assets were sold off to other firms to meet the company's obligations to creditors. Creditors received a share of their money back, but they did sustain losses. Retail clients were largely unhurt, except by those losses sustained generally in the market. The big losers were the stockholders, with the biggest pain borne by those who were running Lehman Brothers — the same people who made tons of money during the boom. The world did not come to an end.

At this point a mainstream economist will complain that if you allowed liquidation, it would result in contagion and runaway deflation, and the economy would enter a black hole. Let's take a look at the role of deflation during a crisis.

First, under deflation, the prices of capital goods fall dramatically. This initially happens with stock prices plunging, but eventually the prices of office buildings, warehouses, retail stores, etc., also fall.
Second, the price of labor will fall as the unemployment rate rises. Wage rates are somewhat "sticky" compared to stock prices and leasing rates for commercial space, but they do tend to fall in real terms if they are not propped up by government intervention and unemployment insurance.
Third, the prices of consumer goods will also fall — but not as much. The demand for "nondiscretionary" consumer goods is not elastic. Things like milk, flour, tobacco, electricity, daycare, and iPhone apps have what economists call "income-inelastic demand" because we don't change the amount we buy either when our incomes increase or decrease. In the past, for example, the quantity demanded of margarine has actually increased when our incomes go down.

This means that in the deflationary-corrective process, the prices of land, capital goods, commodities, and labor are falling relative to consumer goods. This provides potential profit opportunities for entrepreneurs to purchase these greatly depreciated resources in order to make products to sell to the consumer. In other words, the deflationary process is more like a shock absorber than the black hole imagined by mainstream economists.
Not only do profit opportunities emerge, but wage-labor opportunities are scarcer and less attractive. Both influences encourage entrepreneurial behavior, and this is a key factor in any corrective recovery process.
Following the Lehman Bros. plan will result in a contraction in bubble-generated activities and an expansion of consumer-generated activities. Saving will expand relative to consumption. The largest firms will shrink or go out of business, while smaller firms will expand to capture remaining market share. New firms will be started to take advantage of profit opportunities — and to respond to the lack of employment opportunities. It is a well-known fact that small firms create the bulk of new jobs — however, what is not as well-known is that new small firms create the most jobs of all.

The Bernanke/Bush/Obama approach results in nothing but misery and mounting government debt. The Lehman Bros. plan rebalances the scales between the fat-cat, "too big to fail" corporations and the entrepreneurs who will help shape our future.Remember that during the minidepression of 1980–82, Paul Volcker raised the federal-funds rate to 20 percent, ending the stagflation of the 1970s and ushering in one of the most prosperous periods in American history. This period also provided an economic environment rich with cheap resources that Microsoft took advantage of to become a huge success in the PC-software market. Note too that the dot-com meltdown provided the same environment for Google to take advantage of in order to become the king of the search market.

Too Big To Fail - the movie


.
Actor William Hurt playing Henry Paulson in HBO's 'Too Big to Fail' (Photo courtesy of HBO)
HBO's "Too Big To Fail"—I just caught up with it last night; thank you, HBO On Demand—is extraordinarily revealing about the financial crisis. Only its revelations are almost entirely inadvertent.
The movie is set up in the Hollywood conventional way: A gang of misfits, each with a special expertise, is brought together for an impossible mission. There's Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, steely eyed at the moment of truth. There's New York Federal Reserve head Timothy Geithner, the athlete (he doesn't just jog, but also plays what appears to be squash). And then there's Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, the professor with a heart of gold and secret knowledge of the Great Depression.
Ostensibly it's a story of their success against all odds. Michael Kinsley, reviewing the movie in the New York Times, labeled Hank Paulson the "hero" of the account.
Except that the movie actually depicts something entirely different: failure upon failure. "Too Big To Fail" The Movie isn't the story of how the Three Musketeers saved the global economy. It's a story of how the three didn't see the financial crisis coming; hadn't prepared for it; made mistake after mistake as it was cresting; and then, in their moment of triumph, made their most colossal blunder of all.
That, it turns out (whether or not "Too Big To Fail" knows it), is the true story of the financial crisis.
How much did Curtis Hanson and the writers mean for that to be the story? Throughout, the characters drop hints about their missteps, but the plot unfolds like a financial "Die Hard," with our intrepid heroes battling fiendishly powerful forces toward a happy ending. (Full disclosure in this era of transparency: I write a regular column for DealBook, the New York Times section edited by Andrew Ross Sorkin, the reporter upon whose book the movie was based.)
Early on, Paulson complains to his staff that they have been behind on everything as the crisis began to emerge. And that's true! The crisis actually started in the late summer of 2007. Paulson's first effort, late that year, was to get a bunch of banks to assemble a giant off-balance-sheet concoction that would save each individual bank's off-balance-sheet monstrosity. It was a complete flop.
In the movie, as bankers and government officials frantically try to save Lehman, Chris Flowers, the private equity investor and banking impresario, is depicted as informing Paulson and Geithner that AIG is teetering on the edge. In their fumbled response, he immediately grasps the truth. "They're not on top of it," he tells a confederate.
And they weren't. In real life, AIG had been struggling since the middle of 2007. Paulson and Geithner of course had some inkling of the problems at the world's largest insurer. But they didn't prepare for it.
In the movie, the chief executive of General Electric, Jeff Immelt, places a terrified call to Paulson saying that GE can't borrow. GE is standing in for every Real American manufacturing company. We are reminded it makes light bulbs and washing machines. Paulson is shocked that such a stalwart could be having trouble borrowing.
The reality, of course, is that GE was more a finance company than a manufacturer and was teetering because it financed those operations with billions of short-term borrowing. It is also true that Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner had no inkling of GE's troubles until the very last moment and therefore had no plan to deal with it.
Plans are, in the movie, almost nonexistent. The team of heroes races from crisis to crisis, as Bond goes from chase scene to babe, eventually stumbling on the evilSPECTRE plot to take over the world. Intentionally or not, the movie is echoing real life.
Despite warning signs, Paulson, Geithner and Bernanke had no evident plans throughout the last half of 2007 and the first eight months of 2008. Not for how to resolve Lehman after Bear Stearns' collapse, not for AIG, not for recapitalizing the banking system.
Indeed, they asked Congress for $700 billion to implement the Troubled Asset Relief Plan to buy toxic assets from the banks, and then, without any further discussion, abandoned that idea and injected capital into the banks. Many economists and financial experts had been urging them to do just that, but when they finally hit on that as a solution, it was so poorly thought out that they gave the money to the banks on overly generous terms.
This moment is depicted at the end of the movie, and because it is both a triumph in the conventional narrative sense, but also a major mistake by our heroes, it is the  point at which the movie is most cognitively dissonant. Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner have finally come to their solution: Put capital in the banks. They gather outside the boardroom where they are going to confront the CEOs.
For purposes of dramatic tension, we have to see their nervousness that the deal won't go through. The Treasury secretary and the two most powerful central bankers in the country are about rescue these CEOs and their institutions from their own recklessness, yet they cower in fear of rejection.
Of course, this rings true because the government drove awful bargains. In the aftermath of the greatest credit bubble in history, it protected creditors at almost every turn. The government gave the banks money but didn't get voting rights and didn't prevent the banks from using the money to pay dividends or bonuses. They wrote what was essentially a blank check. In real life, Warren Buffett got much better terms when he invested in Goldman Sachs.
What is the audience to make of these scenes? Paulson, our supposed hero, insists that if the government puts any restrictions on the money, "They won't take it!"
It's left to the hapless PR woman, played by Cynthia Nixon (who has, moments earlier, had the crisis explained to her in words of one syllable for the sake of her, and the audience's, simple minds), to wonder why, if the government is saving these institutions, it couldn't impose any limits on how the money be used.
The banks do take the money, of course. They have no choice by the conventions of Hollywood. Nor did they in real life, something that the Three Musketeers never fully appreciated.
After the scene, the Big Three gather in a room, relieved, and Bernanke asks, "They will lend the money out, won't they?" The director, Curtis Hanson, focuses in on Paulson, who gazes out the window, as if contemplating the question for the first time. He insists they will. But an unmistakable moment of doubt passes across his face.
Fade to the postscript. There we learn that, whoops, the banks didn't lend it out after all. Instead, they got bigger, banker bonuses recovered, and Wall Street is getting bottle service at velvet-roped clubs all over again. The world was saved from ruin, but the banks quickly went back to business as usual and even felt self-righteous about it.