Peak Oil

http://www.theburningplatform.com/?p=5581

Bargain-Addicted Investors Ignore Perils of Low Rates

By A. Gary Shilling Oct 28, 2012 5:30 PM CT

The U.K. and the euro zone are in a recession, the U.S. economy is teetering, and a hard landing is unfolding in China. Softness in these three paramount economies is dragging down the rest of the world. So why do most investors seem totally unconcerned over the unfolding global contraction?

This is what I call the Grand Disconnect between weak and weakening economies worldwide, on one hand, and optimistic investors, on the other, who are hooked on massive monetary and fiscal stimulus programs.

“Conditions are so bad that it’s good for my equity portfolio,” the thinking seems to be.

Economies and financial markets have become so dependent on monetary and fiscal bailouts -- and investors so enamored of them -- that all seem to have forgotten the dire circumstances that continue to make these rescues necessary. Many market participants yearn for conditions that are so troubled that central banks and governments, be it in China, the U.S. or Europe, will be spurred to greater easing, with positive implications for stocks.

This almost total reliance on monetary and fiscal stimulus, with little regard for fundamental economic performance -- except to hope that growth will be weak enough to spur more government action -- is a new phenomenon. Until quite recently, there was strong faith in government action, but it was coupled with the belief that such measures would quickly re-establish robust economic growth.

Restoring Growth

I have often been asked what monetary or fiscal actions would rapidly restore economic growth, as if a magic bullet would bring back the salad days of the 1980s and 1990s. My reply was that no such cure existed. The immense monetary and fiscal stimulus in the U.S., including the $1 trillion-plus annual federal-government deficits, the $2.3 trillion in quantitative easing and about $1.5 trillion of excess bank reserves held by the Federal Reserve, probably made the economy and financial markets better off. Nevertheless, slow and now faltering global economic growth indicate that these huge efforts were more than offset by gigantic deleveraging in the private sector. The only thing that would restore normal global growth, I argued, was time -- the five to seven years it will take for deleveraging to be completed.

The search for a magic bullet seems to have been abandoned. The emphasis is now almost solely on the opiate of government stimulus, increasing quantities of which will probably be needed to keep investment addicts satisfied. The recent announcements of quantitative easing by the Fed and the European Central Bank have had a diminishing impact on the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. And recent market actions suggest that QE3 may be a classic case of buy the rumor, sell the news.

What more can be done? The Fed’s commitment to purchase $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities a month is open-ended, and is scheduled to last until the unemployment rate, now at 7.8 percent, drops to the Fed target range of about 5 percent to 6 percent and there is robust job creation. That will probably take a number of years. Meanwhile, excess bank reserves will continue to increase.

So why did Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke push through the third round of quantitative easing? Sure, the Fed has a dual mandate to promote full employment as well as price stability, but QE3 on top of Operation Twist, QE2 and QE1 and all the Wall Street rescue measures the Fed took in 2008 have pushed the central bank deep into the realm of fiscal policy, compromising its fiercely defended independence. Also, the open-ended and unprecedented nature of QE3 might suggest that Bernanke has lost control.

Security Purchases

Furthermore, the effectiveness of previous rounds of quantitative easing is questionable. Even though the Fed has bought $2.3 trillion of long-term securities, economic growth is marginal at best and unemployment remains very high. Of course, we will never know what would have happened had the Fed not acted. History isn’t a controlled experiment where you can change one baffle in the maze, run the rats through again and see if they take a different path.

Two weeks before the Sept. 13 announcement of QE3, Bernanke delivered a speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, defending the Fed’s aggressive policy. He stated that asset purchases until then had reduced the yield on 10-year Treasury notes by 0.8 percent to 1.2 percent and said, “These effects are economically meaningful.” He also noted the increase in stock prices during those quantitative easings. And Bernanke said a Fed study found that QE1 and QE2 had raised output by 3 percent and boosted private payrolls by 2 million “while mitigating deflationary risks.”

Maybe so. What we know for certain is that the Fed’s asset purchases have had a limited effect on the normal financing process. Yes, when the Fed buys Treasuries or mortgage-backed securities, the seller has the proceeds to spend or invest elsewhere. Meanwhile, these funds are deposited in a bank, increasing bank reserves at the Fed. In normal times, these funds are lent and relent by banks in the fractional reserve system, and the net result is that every dollar of reserves turns into about $70 of M2 money supply.

Currently, however, banks are reluctant to lend except to the most creditworthy borrowers, and those people aren’t much interested in borrowing, despite negative real interest rates. As a result, since August 2008, before quantitative easing began, bank reserves have increased by$1.5 trillion and M2 has grown by $2.3 trillion. That’s a 1.5 multiplier, far below the normal 70-fold level. Another way of looking at this is to note the accumulation of excess reserves -- the difference between total and required bank reserves at the Fed -- which now amount to about $1.5 trillion.

Credibility Risk

Another issue that might have given Bernanke pause in pursuing QE3 is the strain it puts on the Fed’s credibility. In his Jackson Hole speech, he said a “potential cost of additional securities purchases is that substantial further expansions of the balance sheet could reduce public confidence in the Fed’s ability to exit smoothly from its accommodative policies at the appropriate time. Even if unjustified, such a reduction in confidence might increase the risk of a costly unanchoring of inflation expectations, leading in turn to financial and economic instability.”

This is a serious risk. Bernanke has stated that the Fed could easily get rid of excess reserves by agreeing, in a 15- minute policy committee phone call, to sell securities from its vast $2.8 trillion portfolio. But let’s imagine the economy five to seven years down the road when deleveraging is completed and real growth moves from about 2 percent a year to its long-run trend of 3 percent to 3.5 percent.

Even then, it would take several years to use excess capacity and labor, as measured by the Commerce Department’s output gap, which is calculated from the difference between current real gross-domestic-product growth and an estimate of the growth potential of the economy.

In any event, when Wall Street gets the slightest hint that the Fed is thinking about removing the excess liquidity, interest rates will surge and the danger of a relapse into a recession will seem very real. Political pressure on the Fed might be intense, and it might be accused of taking away the punch bowl before the party gets started.

Nevertheless, the Fed is much more worried about deflation than inflation. In Jackson Hole, Bernanke said central-bank security purchases were “mitigating deflationary risks.” In deflation, even zero nominal interest rates are positive in real terms, as we have seen repeatedly inJapan.

In deflationary times, to create negative real rates such as those we have now, the central bank can’t reduce the federal funds rate below zero -- although recently, yields for short- term Treasuries, as well as German and Danish government securities, have turned negative. Investors were so eager to hold these securities that they were willing to pay for the privilege. Still, in times of economic weakness, the Fed wants negative real rates to encourage borrowers to borrow. In inflation-adjusted terms, lenders are paying borrowers to take their money.

Zero Rates

Furthermore, in deflationary conditions, the federal funds rate is likely to remain close to zero, where it is at present. But the Fed would like the rate to be high enough so that the central bank can cut it significantly in times of economic weakness as a way to stimulate the economy.

Finally, the Fed fears that deflation, if it becomes chronic as I continue to forecast, will spawn deflationary expectations. Declining prices will encourage buyers to wait for still-lower prices. Their restraint creates excess inventories and unutilized capacity, which push prices lower. That confirms expectations and persuades prospective purchasers to wait for still-lower prices. The result is a self-feeding, downward spiral of prices and economic activity. This, however, hasn’t happened in Japan, which, in the past two decades, has more often experienced deflation than inflation.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-28/bargain-addicted-investors-ignore-perils-of-low-rates.html

@JamesGRickards - Currency Wars Scenarios

The LA Affair...

...all are interesting interviews, you may have heard many of them...

this is the first time i've heard phil anderson...interesting, indeed

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-15/the-world-according-to-lance-key-players/4313246

@JamesGRickards "Bernanke out of the closet"

VideoSapien

Space Leap - 24 miles, 833 MPH

Emma O'reilly

The Two People in the LA Affair with the Greatest Integrity

Betsy Andreu

http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/Andreu+Betsy+Affidavit.pdf

Emma O'Reilly

http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/OReilly%2c+Emma+Affidavit.pdf

The Redacted Riders and Others

Rider 1: Paolo Savoldelli Rider 2: Viatcheslav Ekimov/Beltran/Rubiera Rider 3: Adriano Baffi Rider 4: Bobby Julich Rider 5: Manuel Beltran/Ekimov/Rubiera Rider 6: Jose Luis Rubiera/Ekimov/Beltran Rider 7: Roberto Heras Rider 8: Victor Hugo Pena Rider 9: Matthew White Rider 10: Jose Azevedo/Noval/Padrnos Rider 11: Benjamin Noval/Azevedo/Padrnos Rider 12: Pavel Padrnos/Azevedo/Noval Rider 13: Chann Mcrae Rider 14: Rider 15: Chris Horner Rider 16: Yaroslav Popovych Rider 17: Rider 18: Rider 19: Steffen Kjaergaard Other 1: Emilio Magni Other 2: Bjarne Riis Other 3: Duffy ( or #5) Other 4: Other 5: Other 6: Other 7: Rick Crawford Other 8: Geert Leinders Other 16: Lapage or Demol (?) Other 17: Andy Rihs Other 18: Motoman

Other 11: Freddy Viaene

1 Paolo Savoldelli
2 Manuel Beltran
3 Adriano Baffi
4 Bobby Julich
5 Jose Luis Rubiera
6 Pavel Padrnos
7 Roberto Heras
8 Victor Hugo Pena
9 Matthew White
10 Jose Azevedo
11 Vyatcheslav Ekimov
12 Benjamin Noval
13 Chann McRae
14 Michael Rasmussen
15 Chris Horner
16 Yaroslav Popovych
17 Marty Jemison?
18 Dylan Casey
19 Steffen Kjaergaard
20 Benoit Joachim
21 Tony Cruz
22 =EPO song

Martyn Ashton Trials on Team Sky's Road Bike

Martyn Ashton takes the £10k carbon road bike used by Team Sky's Bradley Wiggins & Mark Cavendish for a ride with a difference. With a plan to push the limits of road biking as far as his lycra legs would dare, Martyn looked to get his ultimate ride out of the awesome Pinarello Dogma 2. This bike won the 2012 Tour de France - surely it deserves a Road Bike Party!

Shot in various locations around the UK and featuring music from 'Sound of Guns'. Road Bike Party captures some of the toughest stunts ever pulled on a carbon road bike.

A Film by Robin Kitchin

Produced by Ashton Bikes

Music: Sound of Guns 'Sometimes'
http://www.facebook.com/soundofguns

Neil Barofsky "Bailout"

How Bird Wings Work

Jim Rogers and Marc Faber

Kyle Bass is Back

click below...

Nanex - HFT Quote Spammer

"The new quote spamming algo first spotted yesterday continues to grow. It accounts for about 4% of all equity quotes and run almost every second of the trading day - except for several 5 minutes gaps. It's signature is so large that it was easy to spot when looking at the consolidated quote feed at millisecond resolution. When it runs, it blasts 200, 400 or 1000 quotes per symbol over about 25 milliseconds of time, and often accounts for 80 percent or more of all quotes during that time. It appears oblivious to market conditions - running whether trading is quiet, or full throttle. Which is disturbing, because bandwidth is extremely scarce at peak activity.

The animation below shows the number of CQS quote messages per 2 millisecond interval colored by reporting exchange according to the legend below. Each frame in the animation below shows the first 1/2 second of each second. The bottom panel shows each exchange's percentage of the total.



Note the red line bulge that appears between the 225 and 350 millisecond of each second. That's our quote spammer."

http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/3614.html

Do Western Central Banks Have Any Gold Left???

By Eric Sprott & David Baker, Sprott Asset Management

Somewhere deep in the bowels of the world’s Western central banks lie vaults holding gargantuan piles of physical gold bars… or at least that’s what they all claim. The gold bars are part of their respective foreign currency reserves, which include all the usual fiat currencies like the dollar, the pound, the yen and the euro.

Collectively, the governments/central banks of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are believed to hold an impressive 23,349 tonnes of gold in their respective reserves, representing more than $1.3 trillion at today’s gold price. Beyond the suggested tonnage, however, very little is actually known about the gold that makes up this massive stockpile. Western central banks disclose next to nothing about where it’s stored, in what form, or how much of the gold reserves are utilized for other purposes. We are assured that it’s all there, of course, but little effort has ever been made by the central banks to provide any details beyond the arbitrary references in their various financial reserve reports.

Twelve years ago, few would have cared what central banks did with their gold. Gold had suffered a twenty year bear cycle and didn’t engender much excitement at $255 per ounce. It made perfect sense for Western governments to lend out (or in the case of Canada – outright sell) their gold reserves in order to generate some interest income from their holdings. And that’s exactly what many central banks did from the late 1980’s through to the late 2000’s. The times have changed however, and today it absolutely does matter what they’re doing with their reserves, and where the reserves are actually held. Why? Because the countries in question are now all grossly over-indebted and printing their respective currencies with reckless abandon. It would be reassuring to know that they still have some of the ‘barbarous relic’ kicking around, collecting dust, just in case their experiment with collusive monetary accommodation doesn’t work out as planned.

You may be interested to know that central bank gold sales were actually the crux of the original investment thesis that first got us interested in the gold space back in 2000. We were introduced to it through the work of Frank Veneroso, who published an outstanding report on the gold market in 1998 aptly titled, “The 1998 Gold Book Annual”. In it, Mr. Veneroso inferred that central bank gold sales had artificially suppressed the full extent of gold demand to the tune of approximately 1,600 tonnes per year (in an approximately 4,000 tonne market of annual supply). Of the 35,000 tonnes that the central banks were officially stated to own at the time, Mr. Veneroso estimated that they were already down to 18,000 tonnes of actual physical. Once the central banks ran out of gold to sell, he surmised, the gold market would be poised for a powerful bull market… and he turned out to be completely right – although central banks did continue to be net sellers of gold for many years to come.

As the gold bull market developed throughout the 2000’s, central banks didn’t become net buyers of physical gold until 2009, which coincided with gold’s final break-out above US$1,000 per ounce. The entirety of this buying was performed by central banks in the non-Western world, however, by countries like Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Philippines… and they have continued buying gold ever since. According to Thomson Reuters GFMS, a precious metals research agency, non-Western central banks purchased 457 tonnes of gold in 2011, and are expected to purchase another 493 tonnes of gold this year as they expand their reserves.¹ Our estimates suggest they will likely purchase even more than that.²The Western central banks, meanwhile, have essentially remained silent on the topic of gold, and have not publicly disclosed any sales or purchases of gold at all over the past three years. Although there is a “Central Bank Gold Agreement” currently in place that covers the gold sales of the Eurosystem central banks, Sweden and Switzerland, there has been no mention of gold sales by the very entities that are purported to own the largest stockpiles of the precious metal.³ The silence is telling.

Over the past several years, we’ve collected data on physical demand for gold as it has developed over time. The consistent annual growth in demand for physical gold bullion has increasingly puzzled us with regard to supply. Global annual gold mine supply ex Russia and China (who do not export domestic production) is actually lower than it was in year 2000, and ever since the IMF announced the completion of its sale of 403 tonnes of gold in December 2010, there hasn’t been any large, publicly-disclosed seller of physical gold in the market for almost two years.⁴ Given the significant increase in physical demand that we’ve seen over the past decade, particularly from buyers in Asia, it suffices to say that we cannot identify where all the gold is coming from to supply it… but it has to be coming from somewhere.

To give you a sense of how much the demand for physical gold has increased over the past decade, we’ve listed a select number of physical gold buyers and calculated their net change in annual demand in tonnes from 2000 to 2012 (see Chart A).

CHART A

Numbers quoted in metric tonnes.

† Source: CBGA1, CBGA2, CBGA3, International Monetary Fund Statistics, Sprott Estimates.
†† Source: Royal Canadian Mint and United States Mint.
††† Includes closed-end funds such as Sprott Physical Gold Trust and Central Fund of Canada.
^ Source: World Gold Council, Sprott Estimates.
^^ Source: World Gold Council, Sprott Estimates.
^^^ Refers to annualized increase over the past eight years.

As can be seen, the mere combination of only five separate sources of demand results in a 2,268 tonne net change in physical demand for gold over the past twelve years – meaning that there is roughly 2,268 tonnes of new annual demand today that didn’t exist 12 years ago. According to the CPM Group, one of the main purveyors of gold statistics, the total annual gold supply is estimated to be roughly 3,700 tonnes of gold this year. Of that, the World Gold Council estimates that only 2,687 tonnes are expected to come from actual mine production, while the rest is attributed to recycled scrap gold, mainly from old jewelry.⁵(See footnote 5). The reporting agencies have a tendency to insist that total physical demand perfectly matches physical supply every year, and use the “Net Private Investment” as a plug to shore up the difference between the demand they attribute to industry, jewelry and ‘official transactions’ by central banks versus their annual supply estimate (which is relatively verifiable). Their “Net Private Investment” figures are implied, however, and do not measure the actual investment demand purchases that take place every year. If more accurate data was ever incorporated into their market summary for demand, it would reveal a huge discrepancy, with the demand side vastly exceeding their estimation of annual supply. In fact, we know it would exceed it based purely on China’s Hong Kong gold imports, which are now up to 458 tonnes year-to-date as of July, representing a 367% increase over its purchases during the same period last year. If the imports continue at their current rate, China will reach 785 tonnes of gold imports by year-end. That’s 785 tonnes in a market that’s only expected to produce roughly 2,700 tonnes of mine supply, and that’s just one buyer.

Then there are all the private buyers whose purchases go unreported and unacknowledged, like that of Greenlight Capital, the hedge fund managed by David Einhorn, that is reported to have purchased $500 million worth of physical gold starting in 2009. Or the $1 billion of physical gold purchased by the University of Texas Investment Management Co. in April 2011… or the myriad of other private investors (like Saudi Sheiks, Russian billionaires, this writer, probably many of our readers, etc.) who have purchased physical gold for their accounts over the past decade. None of these private purchases are ever considered in the research agencies’ summaries for investment demand, and yet these are real purchases of physical gold, not ETF’s or gold ‘certificates’. They require real, physical gold bars to be delivered to the buyer. So once we acknowledge how big the discrepancy is between the actual true level of physical gold demand versus the annual “supply”, the obvious questions present themselves: who are the sellers delivering the gold to match the enormous increase in physical demand? What entities are releasing physical gold onto the market without reporting it? Where is all the gold coming from?

There is only one possible candidate: the Western central banks. It may very well be that a large portion of physical gold currently flowing to new buyers is actually coming from the Western central banks themselves. They are the only holders of physical gold who are capable of supplying gold in a quantity and manner that cannot be readily tracked. They are also the very entities whose actions have driven investors back into gold in the first place. Gold is, after all, a hedge against their collective irresponsibility – and they have showcased their capacity in that regard quite enthusiastically over the past decade, especially since 2008.

If the Western central banks are indeed leasing out their physical reserves, they would not actually have to disclose the specific amounts of gold that leave their respective vaults. According to a document on the European Central Bank’s (ECB) website regarding the statistical treatment of the Eurosystem’s International Reserves, current reporting guidelines do not require central banks to differentiate between gold owned outright versus gold lent out or swapped with another party. The document states that, “reversible transactions in gold do not have any effect on the level of monetary gold regardless of the type of transaction (i.e. gold swaps, repos, deposits or loans), in line with the recommendations contained in the IMF guidelines.”⁶ (Emphasis theirs). 

Under current reporting guidelines, therefore, central banks are permitted to continue carrying the entry of physical gold on their balance sheet even if they’ve swapped it or lent it out entirely. You can see this in the way Western central banks refer to their gold reserves. The UK Government, for example, refers to its gold allocation as, “Gold (incl. gold swapped or on loan)”. That’s the verbatim phrase they use in their official statement. Same goes for the US Treasury and the ECB, which report their gold holdings as “Gold (including gold deposits and, if appropriate, gold swapped)” and “Gold (including gold deposits and gold swapped)”, respectively (see Chart B). Unfortunately, that’s as far as their description goes, as each institution does not break down what percentage of their stated gold reserves are held in physical, versus what percentage has been loaned out or swapped for something else. The fact that they do not differentiate between the two is astounding, (Ed. As is the “including gold deposits” verbiage that they use – what else is “gold” supposed to refer to?) but at the same time not at all surprising. It would not lend much credence to central bank credibility if they admitted they were leasing their gold reserves to ‘bullion bank’ intermediaries who were then turning around and selling their gold to China, for example. But the numbers strongly suggest that that is exactly what has happened. The central banks’ gold is likely gone, and the bullion banks that sold it have no realistic chance of getting it back.

CHART B

Sources:
1) http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Documents/reserves/2012/Aug/tempoutput.pdf2) http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/IR-Position/Pages/08312012.aspx 
3) http://www.ecb.int/stats/external/reserves/html/assets_8.812.E.en.html
4) http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/account/zai1205a.pdf
5) http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm
6) http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/annrep_2011_komplett/source

Notes:
ECB Data as of July 2012. Bank of Japan data as of March 31, 2012.

* European Central Bank reserves is composed of reserves held by the ECB, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
** Bank of Japan only lists its gold reserves in Yen at book value.

Our analysis of the physical gold market shows that central banks have most likely been a massive unreported supplier of physical gold, and strongly implies that their gold reserves are negligible today. If Frank Veneroso’s conclusions were even close to accurate back in 1998 (and we believe they were), when coupled with the 2,300 tonne net change in annual demand we can easily identify above, it can only lead to the conclusion that a large portion of the Western central banks’ stated 23,000 tonnes of gold reserves are merely a paper entry on their balance sheets – completely un-backed by anything tangible other than an IOU from whatever counterparty leased it from them in years past. At this stage of the game, we don’t believe these central banks will be able to get their gold back without extreme difficulty, especially if it turns out the gold has left their countries entirely. We can also only wonder how much gold within the central bank system has been ‘rehypothecated’ in the process, since the central banks in question seem so reluctant to divulge any meaningful details on their reserves in a way that would shed light on the various “swaps” and “loans” they imply to be participating in. We might also suggest that if a proper audit of Western central bank gold reserves was ever launched, as per Ron Paul’s recent proposal to audit the US Federal Reserve, the proverbial cat would be let out of the bag – with explosive implications for the gold price.

Notwithstanding the recent conversions of PIMCO’s Bill Gross, Bridegwater’s Ray Dalio and Ned Davis Research to gold, we realize that many mainstream institutional investors still continue to struggle with the topic. We also realize that some readers may scoff at any analysis of the gold market that hints at “conspiracy”. We’re not talking about conspiracy here however, we’re talking about stupidity. After all, Western central banks are probably under the impression that the gold they’ve swapped and/or lent out is still legally theirs, which technically it may be. But if what we are proposing turns out to be true, and those reserves are not physically theirs; not physically in their possession… then all bets are off regarding the future of our monetary system. As a general rule of common sense, when one embarks on an unlimited quantitative easing program targeted at the employment rate (see QE3), one had better make sure to have something in the vault as backup in case the ‘unlimited’ part actually ends up really meaning unlimited. We hope that it does not, for the sake of our monetary system, but given our analysis of the physical gold market, we’ll stick with our gold bars and take comfort as they collect more dust in our vaults, untouched.

By: Mr. Eric Sprott Chairman, Sprott Money Ltd , CEO, CIO & Senior Portfolio Manager & Mr. David Baker, Sprott Asset Management

1	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/central-bank-gold-buying-seen-reaching-493-tons-in-2012-by-gfms.html
2	See notes in Chart A.
3	http://www.gold.org/government_affairs/reserve_asset_management/central_bank_gold_agreements/
4	http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/goldfaqs.htm
5	Mine supply estimate supplied by World Gold Council; YTD gold mine production data suggests that total 2012 gold mine supply will come in lower around 2,300 tonnes, ex Russia and China production. In addition, Frank Veneroso has recently published a new report that warns that the supply of recycled scrap gold could drop significantly going forward due to the depletion ofthe inventories of industrial scrap and long held jewelry over the past decade.
	http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/statintreservesen.pdf http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1349208462.php

Homer Votes

RP-BP is apolitical...