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Monday, February 28, 2011

Numbers on Drafting


I used to think, many years ago, that on a high mountain climb that the domestiques were just pacing the team leaders up the mountain and that the speed was not high enough to really have a "drafting" effect as on the flats.  Since the medical revolution of the 90's I started realizing they were actually moving up the high mountains fast enough that the drafting effect would be significant.

I've also always thought the motorcycles videoing the leaders up the mountains, and other places, had to be giving a drafting advantage to the riders on the front.  How many times have we seen the riders try to advanced their position behind a motorcycle.

Here is some hard evidence...from 53x12.com

By: Michele Ferrari
Published: 25 Jan 2011

Two professional cyclists of similar size (185cm and 75kg) covered 1 km on flat course several times, at different speeds, alternating their positions: either in the front or drafting from the other.

The graph below shows the difference in power output in watts between pushing at the front and drafting from a single rider: the saving at 30 km/h is 60w, increasing to 120w at 40 km/h and getting up to 220w at 50 km/h.
It is interesting to note that at 22-24 km/h the saving is about 40w: a quite considerable advantage also for speeds that are typical of climbing, corresponding to about 10% in power for a cyclist that pushes 400w.
For a small sized cyclist, such advantage is even more significant, especially when drafting from a taller athlete: 50w for a rider climbing at 320w represent a 15% saving approximately.
Therefore, smaller and lighter cyclists have an edge in mountain stages not only for the lower body weight, but also due to the fact that they definitely save more energy from drafting, compared to heavier competitors.

Another cyclist covered alone the same 1 km stretch of flat road at 48 km/h, expressing an average power of 410w.
He repeated the performance with a motorcycle 15m ahead of him: the average was 385w, a saving of 6%.
Whenever we see the multitude of photographers motorbikes repeatedly hovering around the leading rider in a race, such considerable advantage is automatically given to him: it is as if they temporarily subjected him to an instantaneous transfusion of 1-2 units of blood...

Saturday, February 26, 2011

Ronaldo

...i don't watch "football", other than the occasional World Cup match, but, Ronaldo is amazing...

Friday, February 25, 2011

Yeah, Right



Contador's lawyer reveals defence strategy



By: 

Jane Aubrey

First Edition Cycling News, Friday, February 25, 2011
Less than one per cent of Spanish cattle are tested for Clenbuterol
Alberto Contador's lawyer has explained that the Spaniard escaped a doping ban for Clenbuterol because he was unaware he ingested the substance, via a piece of filet mignon, during the 2010 Tour de France.
Earlier this month, the Royal Spanish Cycling Federation decided tooverturn its recommendation to ban Contador for a year following hispositive test.
Article 296 of the UCI's anti-doping regulations says that an athlete can be exonerated if they prove that they had inadvertently ingested a banned product through no fault or negligence on their part and Contador's lawyer, Andy Ramos, has told The Independent that this proved to be the catalyst for the Spaniard's acquittal.
"The [anti-doping] legislation states that a rider is responsible for any banned substance in his body," he said. "But there's a clause that frees him of that responsibility if he can demonstrate there was no intentional negligence. We proved that, and that was the key to his defence. From day one his defence was based around that clause."
Another key piece of evidence which helped to clear Contador was the small amount of Spanish cattle which are tested for Clenbuterol.
"We showed that the testing for Clenbuterol in cattle is not infallible in Europe," Ramos continued. "There is a European Union norm – 96/23/CE, dating from 1996 – which states that only 0.25 per cent of cattle should be tested for Clenbuterol. So 99.75 per cent are not."
Ramos also revealed that Basque authorities traced the supplier of the offending piece of beef back to three possible sources. The meat in question was bought by Spanish cycling organiser, Jose Luis Lopez Cerron, a friend of the Astana team chef who had complained of poor quality meat at the hotel where the team was staying on July 20.
"Curiously enough, the owner of the [supplier] one that was most likely to be it is in partnership with [the supplier's] his brother, who was penalised a few years back for using Clenbuterol," he said.
The UCI and WADA are yet to announce if they will appeal the decision.

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Thursday, February 24, 2011

LA and EPO

...from NYVeloCity...
Fri, 04/03/2009 - 1:57am by Andy
"So there is no doubt in my mind he (Lance Armstrong) took EPO during the '99 Tour."

Dr. Michael Ashenden began his career as an exercise physiologist with the Australian Institute of Sport. After assisting in the development of an EPO test for the Sydney Olympic Games, he left the AIS to focus on battling blood doping. In 2005, Dr. Ashenden was among of group of scientists who questioned the validity of a physiological study on Lance Armstrong, a dispute that led him to serve as an expert witness in an arbitration case involving Armstrong and a bonus payment for winning the Tour. Dr. Ashenden kindly agreed to speak with us and shed some new light on that controversy. He also helped us analyze the 6 positives from Armstrong's '99 Tour samples with a level of detail never before made public.
Personal background, the 2000 Olympics, EPO testing
Andy Shen: Can we start with a little background on you, starting with the Australian Institute of Sport? I guess at that time you were doing some work on blood doping, but you were also doing some work on performance enhancement.
Michael Ashenden: I was employed as an exercise physiologist with the AIS, and my job was to do physiological testing on the athletes, for example, to give the coaches feedback and assistance with their training programs. At the same time I was doing my PhD thesis that was studying what happened to athletes' blood when they were exposed to simulated altitude, hypoxic tents and such which have since become popular.
And that dovetailed nicely with research at the time that was looking for indirect markers of EPO, because not coincidentally I guess, the changes in the blood that we see with EPO were sometimes similar to changes you'd see at altitude, though dramatically on different scales. But it was easy for me to transfer my research and my knowledge there over to this EPO field and I guess that's where I began my career in anti doping, being part of the team in Australia who were working on what's since been called the Sydney Blood Model. And from there I left the institute and I've been working as a freelance researcher not just in EPO doping but other kinds of blood doping. Blood tranfusions, blood substitutes, pretty much any avenue I think an athlete might be tempted to abuse, we try to conduct research in those areas.
AS: The work you did for the Sydney Olympics, that was in 2000?
MA: Yeah, at that time there was no test at all for EPO, and the UCI was using a 50% hematocrit rule to stop athletes from competing, but it couldn't go any further than stopping them competing. So, there was a group in France that was researching what's since become known as the urine test for EPO, and we collaborated with them, we shared samples with them, to help the research move forward. But we took a different strategy, we looked for indirect evidence.
We were looking for changes in the blood that were not only apparent in the period when the athlete was using EPO, and that's the period when EPO is still in the urine, but blood remains disturbed for several weeks after you stop taking EPO as well. The urine test can't help you there, but the blood test still gives you a signature, depending on how much EPO you took, a couple of weeks after you stop injecting.
AS: The EPO test was implemented for the 2000 Olympics?
MA: At the Sydney Olympics they had the two part test. There was an initial blood screening, and if those results exceeded the threshold that were put in place, then the urine was analyzed. And the criteria back then was that you had to fail both the blood and the urine test in order to be found guilty of having used EPO.
Since that time WADA has revised the rule and now you only have to fail the urine test. Whether your blood fails criteria or not is not taken into account in today's test.
AS: So just to be clear, the urine test looks for the actual presence of synthetic EPO, but EPO leaves your system in two or three days?
MA: EPO is a hormone, it's a very small molecule, and it's present in very very low concentrations in the bloodstream, even lower concentrations in urine. And the half life of EPO is something in the realm of eight to twelve hours, so one day after you've had an injection the levels are dramatically lower. Usually three or four days after you've had an injection all traces of EPO have left the circulation or at least aren't present at a high enough level for the urine test to be a definitive piece of evidence that EPO is being used.
AS: When you test positive in a urine test, it's not a yes or no thing, it's a percentage and a threshold, is that correct?
MA: I think that's arguable. It's a test that discriminates, it puts in different positions on the gel, synthetic EPO and natural EPO. Now, there is no confusion when you see it on the gel, when there's synthetic EPO in the sample. It's simply in a different position to where the natural EPO occurs.
So when you say it's not yes or no, you can see visually if there is synthetic EPO in the gel. They build in some allowance, some tolerance, the positivity criteria that are in place today follows specific rules. And even though there's EPO in the gel, unless it fails those specific criteria a sanction isn't imposed.
AS: Ok, so in other words, the tester will know you're using it, but you won't be busted for it if you're below a certain number.
MA: Yeah, and there are situations like that floating about today. Where it's clearly a pattern that an athlete has been using synthetic EPO, but for different reasons the pattern doesn't follow a specific criteria. So the answer is, yes, obviously they're using EPO, but they weren't sanctioned because the samples didn't fail a very specific criteria that were applied.
AS: And this number is a percentage of isoforms?
MA: That was the first generation of tests. Since then the positivity criteria has been modified, and now it looks at several different aspects, not just the percentage of basic isoforms.
EPO use in 1999
AS: I want to go to the '99 Tour samples. Just to set the scene, in '99 there wasn't a test in place for EPO, and Frankie Andreu told us there was no anxiety about using it, because as long as you made sure your hematocrit was below 50% you knew nothing could happen to you. Would it be fair to say that at that time it was pretty easy for cyclists to beat the test, or use EPO with impunity?
MA: Well, I wouldn't say that it was easy for them to beat the test, because there was no test. Simple as that. There was no way, before the Sydney Olympics in 2000, where an athlete could be found guilty of using EPO, because there was no test in play. There's no reason for an athlete to be careful using something for which they can't be caught.
AS: As long as they kept their hematocrit below 50.
MA: And that's a relatively easy thing to accomplish. I mean, you can either use careful adjustments of your dosage, or you can use saline to dilute the blood. It's a relatively simple and fast procedure to bring your hematocrit below 50.
AS: Yeah, in fact, from the time you're notified of a test you can actually dilute your blood fast enough to beat the test.
MA: Yeah, it was quite disturbing for me to be told that right up until perhaps 2004, the UCI weren't actually chaperoning riders between the finish line and doping control. So not only was there an opportunity for them to dilute their blood before a blood test in the morning, there was also a very real opportunity for them to manipulate or mask their urine before they provided their doping control sample. That wasn't important pre 2000 because there was no urine test for EPO, but after 2000 there was still, to me, unacceptably large loopholes for an athlete, even if they've been using EPO, to still escape detection. Particularly by masking their urine, in between the time they crossed the finish line and dope control.
'99 Tour urine samples re-tested in '05
AS: Let's go back to the '99 urine samples, these were B samples which were preserved. Was it for academic reasons that they re-tested, to get a sense of how things were at the time?
MA: I mentioned earlier there'd been revisions over time of what the positivity criteria were. Initially it was 80% basic isoforms. The research that was conducted with these samples was informing them of whether new criteria they were considering applying would have been effective in catching athletes in previous events.
The only kind of samples that are useful in that context are samples that have got EPO in them, 'cause then you could say by criteria A you'd fail, but by criteria B you didn't fail, and by criteria C we saw nothing at all. And that was the purpose of the Paris investigation - to go back, to look at samples, and to see how the different criteria applied. And it was, I don't think it was cynical, it was realistic, they realized that the most likely samples where they would find EPO were samples collected before the EPO test was introduced. And that was the '99 Tour de France.
Lance Armstrong's '99 samples test positive
AS: So out of the 87 usable samples that they gathered, they got 13 positives and 6 of them belonged to Lance Armstrong.
MA: Depending on which criteria you applied. Yes, six of them failed the definitive criteria. There were another two samples in fact where the EPO was visually there in the gel. You could see it was there, but for one reason or another, the percentage isoforms weren't calculated, or had to be re-analyzed, or it was a little bit too faint to get a definitive result. Yes, there were six samples with EPO in it, and there were another two samples where it was pretty plain to a trained observer that there was synthetic EPO in those as well.
AS: You were able to analyze the results, correct?
MA: I interpreted the results. They assessed each sample according the different criteria, and those were the results that we were given.
AS: I found it kinda interesting, we've talked before this, you found some very interesting things about those results that really were not widely publicized, the way the percentages fluctuated.
MA: One of the things, I guess there's been misinformation in this particular area - is that the samples weren't analyzed properly, that they were analyzed using a different protocol than what was used in proper dope controls - and that's just not correct. Obviously in research where the data you come up with is going to govern how you do testing in the future, you're exceptionally careful with these measurements. You want to make sure that you don't make any mistakes. And you want to make sure that you, for example, weren't looking at urine that has been contaminated with bacteria, or isn't what we call unstable urine, where sometimes the bands shift not because of EPO use, but because of some other factors. So all of these checks and cross checks were put in place with these samples, so the data is valid. The laboratory, I've checked with the people who did the analysis, and I very carefully went through it with them. They're absolutely 100% sure that these results are valid.
And as far as the fluctuations you speak of, when we took the samples' dates, and matched them with the percentage of isoforms, and overlaid that with the performances during the Tour de France, then a clear pattern begins to emerge. You can see that on some days there's a preponderance of EPO in the urine sample, perhaps on the next day they come down a little bit, then they come back up, which is suggesting you've taken another EPO injection.
You don't have EPO every single day. You might take it every two or three days. So your values go up or down according to when you took those injections and when those urine samples were taken. Now, you overlay all of those data together and you can begin to see a pattern that's consistent with EPO use.

Stage
Vial #
Visual
Interpretation
% Isoforms
Stage
description
Prologue
160297
+
100

1
157372
+
89.7

2-7




Out of lead,
not tested
8
186584
+
To be reanalyzed
Metz ITT
Rest day




9
185557
+
96.6
Sestriere
10
185479
+
88.7
L'Alpe d'Huez
11
185476

Sample missing

12
185475
+
95.2

13
185895
+
Weak intensity, no % recorded

14
186397
+
89.4

Rest day




15-20


Undetectable, insufficient EPO in urine


AS: The prologue had the highest number, 100% if I remember correctly, and the next day it goes down a bit. Same thing before the first mountain stage, etc.
MA: And the unusual thing about the prologue sample is that the prologue was run in the morning, and the sample was collected at 9:45 am. Now, every other sample during the Tour de France is collected in the afternoon, after the stage is finished. This sample was collected very early in the morning, and there was 100% basic isoforms, which is saying that 100% of the EPO that was showing up in the gel was synthetic EPO. There was no endogenous EPO visual in the gel.
The possibility of tampering
AS: I guess I should set the background a little bit more now. This study was done for research purposes so the urine was marked with code numbers and there was no way for the testers to know who the samples belong to. It was only through some subterfuge by some French reporters that it was revealed that the six positives belonged to Armstrong.
MA: Well, again, there's been a lot of disinformation about this. The laboratory absolutely had no way of knowing athlete identity from the sample they're given. They have a number on them, but that's never linked to an athlete's name. The only group that had both the number and the athlete's name is the federation, in this case it was the UCI.
The UCI had those documents, and an investigative journalist, Damien Ressiot from l'Equipe, went to the UCI and said, "Can I have copies of Lance Armstrong's doping control forms from the '99 Tour?" Now, the UCI had to go to Lance Armstrong and ask his permission, which he gave them. Now, Lance Armstrong gave permission to the UCI to give these doping control forms to Damien Ressiot. Damien Ressiot took those forms, which have the athlete's name, obviously, and the sample number, so he matched the sample number with the results from the laboratory that had the sample number and the percentage of isoforms. And in that way he linked the percentage of isoforms with the number, the athlete's name, and in that way identified them as Lance Armstrong.
AS: Right. So the lab is carrying out these tests blindly, and you showed me this statistical study of the odds of them tampering and successfully framing Armstrong, and it was 1 in 300.
MA: There was only two conceivable ways that synthetic EPO could've gotten into those samples. One, is that Lance Armstrong used EPO during the '99 Tour, and we've since found out that there were teammates from US Postal in that '99 Tour that have since admitted using EPO while riding for US Postal in that Tour.
The other way it could've got in the urine was if, as Lance Armstrong seems to believe, the laboratory spiked those samples. Now, that's an extraordinary claim, and there's never ever been any evidence the laboratory has ever spiked an athlete's sample, even during the Cold War, where you would've thought there was a real political motive to frame an athlete from a different country. There's never been any suggestion that it happened.
However, Lance Armstrong made that claim. Now, it's very easy to go back and assess the possibility of that scenario. We know the laboratory could not have known which samples belonged to Lance Armstrong. And we also know from the results, how many of Lance Armstrong's samples had EPO in them, and when during the race it occurred. Now the odds of the laboratory randomly selecting Lance Armstrong's samples out of those 87 samples, and let's just do it conservatively, just 6 times, 6 times they got his samples correct out of 87 possible tubes, the odds of that occurring are at least 1 in 300.
So we come back to the original scenario. Either Lance Armstrong used EPO during the Tour, or the laboratory spiked his samples, and we know the probabilty of that happening was at least 1 in 300.
(I needed to reassure myself that tampering was inconceivable, so I did some follow up with Dr. Ashenden. Click here if you're interested in what it would've taken to spike these samples.)
An irrefutable profile
AS: And of course, if you take it to the next level, let's say, not only will they have to spike it, they have to spike it in a way that when positive samples are on concurrent days, the second day has to be a lower percentage. And not only that, when they spike the prologue sample they have to spike it really high because it was after a short effort and it was tested earlier in the day. Now if you take those factors into consideration the odds become astronomical, don't they?
MA: I honestly can't conceive how you could possibly do that. I don't understand how you could inject enough EPO so that the percentage was slightly lower on the next day, it just beggars belief that you could adjust the amount of EPO you put in a sample by such a miniscule amount. And to be quite frank, it doesn't hold up to scientific scrutiny, it's a fantastic claim in the literal sense of the word, it's not backed up by a shred of evidence at all, and I think it needs to be taken on that merit.
AS: So outside of deliberate tampering, is there any way contamination, degradation, is there any way synthetic EPO appears in urine because of contamination, degradation, bad handling, bad refrigeration, anything?
MA: The short answer is no but I have to clarify that. There is evidence that sometimes if a urine sample is stored unfrozen, there can be some contamination of the sample that shifts the band up towards the area we associate with synthetic EPO. Now, it can still be distinguished but it makes it more difficult. There is a test and this is in place throughout laboratories today, they can determine whether or not the sample has that unstable profile.
That possibility was excluded in all of these samples. So yes, it's conceivable that contamination can shift the band, but it didn't happen in this case, that was definitively excluded. There is no way that synthetic EPO can suddenly appear. It can disappear, you could conceivably have degradation where synthetic EPO could break down, it's not likely but it's conceivable. But in that scenario you've got synthetic EPO disappearing, not appearing. It's breaking a pretty fundamental law of physics to say you can generate a molecule of EPO from nothing.
AS: So based on that, you can definitively say that Lance Armstrong used EPO in the '99 Tour. No doubt in your mind.
MA: There is no doubt in my mind these samples contain synthetic EPO, they belong to Lance Armstrong, and there's no conceivable way that I can see that a lab could've spiked them in a way that the data has presented itself. So there is no doubt in my mind he took EPO during the '99 Tour.
The rest of the '99 samples
AS: The other thing that struck me about these results, which I was surprised never came up before, was that if you take away those 6 positives, you have 7 remaining positives out of 81 samples. That's 8.6%. Does that say to you that at that time the peloton was relatively clean?
MA: Yeah, it's an interesting observation, 'cause you cast back to the '98 Tour, obviously it was a debacle. And, I've heard anecdotal or off the cuff remarks, that '99 was a new beginning. It had gotten as bad as it could possibly get, or so we would've thought, and '99 was, "Ok, let's start again, we've really got to make an effort to be clean this year."
Well, obviously, based on Lance Armstrong's results, he wasn't racing clean. But for the rest of the samples collected during the Tour, relatively speaking there wasn't a very high prevalence of EPO use in the rest of the peloton, at least in the peloton that was tested, which was your top 3 place getters, for example.
The prologue was interesting. First race of the event, every one of those samples had EPO in them. So it seems a little odd, the first day of the next year's race, and all of your place getters have got EPO in their urine. On the one hand, yes, it seemed less prevalent than you would've otherwise thought, but on the other there's still evidence there was doping in the peloton. Not just by Lance Armstrong.
AS: I guess it's possible that some guys were injecting during the Tour, and some had an EPO program leading up to the Tour and counted on the effects to remain with them?
MA: It's conceivable. It's widely known that you don't have to be using EPO to get the benefits. You can have a treatment regime that could last as little as ten days, and the benefits are substantial and they'll stay with you for four weeks afterwards. And certainly for the Tour, which is three weeks. So, you don't have to use EPO during the Tour to get the benefits.
AS: I just want to go back to the percentage. Obviously, stage winners are always tested, and there were, I believe Cipollini won four, Steels won three, Etxebarria won two, so, not that I'm accusing them, but there's a chance that some of these positives are from the same person, so there's a chance that the number of people positive is even lower than 8%. And not only that, a great deal of these samples are from stage winners, so they're the stronger riders. So the samples are a skewed sampling of the entire peloton.
MA: Yeah, that's correct.
AS: So you could say as a whole it might've been 8% or less.
MA: And there is no way to identify who those other samples belong to without getting access to the medical records and matching the numbers to their names. So, I've read reports, but I've never seen documented evidence to link names to numbers.
AS: It's interesting because when I spoke with Paul Kimmage he made a pretty big deal about that year's Tour, that it was supposed to be this Tour of redemption, and his point was that Armstrong came along and brought things back to the old ways. These results lend that belief a little bit of credence, don't they?
MA: I think there's a couple of things that strike me as well. Yes, these results are consistent with that argument. The other is that we know how Armstrong performed before the '99 Tour. '93, '94, '95, '96. And look, a couple of those races he couldn't even finish, another race I think he's an hour and a half behind. Specifically in the time trial he was dropping minutes to the other competitors.
Now compare that with '99, and it's a helluva transformation. Instead of dropping off and not being competitive, he was actually dropping the rest of the peloton off. So something dramatically changed in relation to Armstrong versus the rest of the peloton across that period of time. That's unarguable.
There's, as we've been talking about, pretty unequivocal evidence, well, it is unequivocal evidence, that he was using EPO during the '99 Tour. Now, that would go a long way to explaining that reversal in competitiveness in Armstrong v. the peloton.
...for the rest of the interview...hit this link

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

PimPco Co-CIO Mohamed El-Erian

On the Middle East, Stagflation, USD days numbered as World Reserve Currency...

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Revolution and the Muslim World

...from Stratfor

 February 22, 2011 | 0949 GMT

The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink.
There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire. These moments do not come often. Those that come to mind include 1848, where a rising in France engulfed Europe. There was also 1968, where the demonstrations of what we might call the New Left swept the world: Mexico City, Paris, New York and hundreds of other towns saw anti-war revolutions staged by Marxists and other radicals. Prague saw the Soviets smash a New Leftist government. Even China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could, by a stretch, be included. In 1989, a wave of unrest, triggered by East Germans wanting to get to the West, generated an uprising in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule.
Each had a basic theme. The 1848 uprisings attempted to establish liberal democracies in nations that had been submerged in the reaction to Napoleon. 1968 was about radical reform in capitalist society. 1989 was about the overthrow of communism. They were all more complex than that, varying from country to country. But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.
Some of these revolutions had great impact. 1989 changed the global balance of power. 1848 ended in failure at the time — France reverted to a monarchy within four years — but set the stage for later political changes. 1968 produced little that was lasting. The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.
The Current Rising in Context
In looking at the current rising, the geographic area is clear: The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises. Of course, many other Muslim countries also had revolutionary events that have not, at least until now, escalated into events that threaten regimes or even ruling personalities. There have been hints of such events elsewhere. There were small demonstrations in China, and of course Wisconsin is in turmoil over budget cuts. But these don’t really connect to what is happening in the Middle East. The first was small and the second is not taking inspiration from Cairo. So what we have is a rising in the Arab world that has not spread beyond there for the time being.
The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted. This has expressed itself in different ways. In Bahrain, for example, the rising was of the primarily Shiite population against a predominantly Sunni royal family. In Egypt, it was against the person of Hosni Mubarak. In Libya, it is against the regime and person of Moammar Gadhafi and his family, and is driven by tribal hostility.
Why has it come together now? One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War. Since the early 1970s, the region has, with the exception of Iran in 1979, been fairly stable in the sense that the regimes — and even the personalities who rose up in the unstable phase — stabilized their countries and imposed regimes that could not easily be moved. Gadhafi, for example, overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and has governed continually for 42 years since then.
Any regime dominated by a small group of people over time will see that group use their position to enrich themselves. There are few who can resist for 40 years. It is important to recognize that Gadhafi, for example, was once a genuine, pro-Soviet revolutionary. But over time, revolutionary zeal declines and avarice emerges along with the arrogance of extended power. And in the areas of the region where there had not been regime changes since after World War I, this principle stays true as well, although interestingly, over time, the regimes seem to learn to spread the wealth a bit.
Thus, what emerged throughout the region were regimes and individuals who were classic kleptocrats. More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time. And we can add to this that they are people who were planning to maintain family power and money by installing sons as their political heirs. The same process, with variations, is under way in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a rising against the revolutionaries of previous generations.
The revolutions have been coming for a long time. The rising in Tunisia, particularly when it proved successful, caused it to spread. As in 1848, 1968 and 1989, similar social and cultural conditions generate similar events and are triggered by the example of one country and then spread more broadly. That has happened in 2011 and is continuing.
A Uniquely Sensitive Region
It is, however, happening in a region that is uniquely sensitive at the moment. The U.S.-jihadist war means that, as with previous revolutionary waves, there are broader potential geopolitical implications. 1989 meant the end of the Soviet empire, for example. In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them. We do not see these revolutions as a vast conspiracy by radical Islamists to take control of the region. A conspiracy that vast is easily detected, and the security forces of the individual countries would have destroyed the conspiracies quickly. No one organized the previous waves, although there have been conspiracy theories about them as well. They arose from certain conditions, following the example of one incident. But particular groups certainly tried, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of them.
In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them. Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious. They are a broad, transnational and disparate group brought up in conspiratorial methods. This is their opportunity to create a broad international coalition. Thus, as with traditional communists and the New Left in the 1960s, they did not create the rising but they would be fools not to try to take advantage of it. I would add that there is little question but that the United States and other Western countries are trying to influence the direction of the uprisings. For both sides, this is a difficult game to play, but it is particularly difficult for the United States as outsiders to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.
But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.
Democratic revolutions have two phases. The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments. The example of Hitler is useful as a caution on what kind of governments a young democracy can produce, since he came to power through democratic and constitutional means — and then abolished democracy to cheering crowds. So there are three crosscurrents here. The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.
In any event, the real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes. Let’s consider the process of revolution for the moment, beginning by distinguishing a demonstration from an uprising. A demonstration is merely the massing of people making speeches. This can unsettle the regime and set the stage for more serious events, but by itself, it is not significant. Unless the demonstrations are large enough to paralyze a city, they are symbolic events. There have been many demonstrations in the Muslim world that have led nowhere; consider Iran.
It is interesting here to note that the young frequently dominate revolutions like 1848, 1969 and 1989 at first. This is normal. Adults with families and maturity rarely go out on the streets to face guns and tanks. It takes young people to have the courage or lack of judgment to risk their lives in what might be a hopeless cause. However, to succeed, it is vital that at some point other classes of society join them. In Iran, one of the key moments of the 1979 revolution was when the shopkeepers joined young people in the street. A revolution only of the young, as we saw in 1968 for example, rarely succeeds. A revolution requires a broader base than that, and it must go beyond demonstrations. The moment it goes beyond the demonstration is when it confronts troops and police. If the demonstrators disperse, there is no revolution. If they confront the troops and police, and if they carry on even after they are fired on, then you are in a revolutionary phase. Thus, pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.
A Revolution’s Key Event
This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event. In Bahrain, the troops fired on demonstrators and killed some. The demonstrators dispersed and then were allowed to demonstrate — with memories of the gunfire fresh. This was a revolution contained. In Egypt, the military and police opposed each other and the military sided with the demonstrators, for complex reasons obviously. Personnel change, if not regime change, was inevitable. In Libya, the military has split wide open.
When that happens, you have reached a branch in the road. If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war. Indeed, one way for a revolution to succeed is to proceed to civil war, turning the demonstrators into an army, so to speak. That’s what Mao did in China. Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success. Always, the point to look for is thus the police joining with the demonstrators. This happened widely in 1989 but hardly at all in 1968. It happened occasionally in 1848, but the balance was always on the side of the state. Hence, that revolution failed.
It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution. Therefore, to return to the earlier theme, the most important question on the role of radical Islamists is not their presence in the crowd, but their penetration of the military and police. If there were a conspiracy, it would focus on joining the military, waiting for demonstrations and then striking.
Those who argue that these risings have nothing to do with radical Islam may be correct in the sense that the demonstrators in the streets may well be students enamored with democracy. But they miss the point that the students, by themselves, can’t win. They can only win if the regime wants them to, as in Egypt, or if other classes and at least some of the police or military — people armed with guns who know how to use them — join them. Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.
The problem with revolutions is that the people who start them rarely finish them. The idealist democrats around Alexander Kerensky in Russia were not the ones who finished the revolution. The thuggish Bolsheviks did. In these Muslim countries, the focus on the young demonstrators misses the point just as it did in Tiananmen Square. It wasn’t the demonstrators that mattered, but the soldiers. If they carried out orders, there would be no revolution.
I don’t know the degree of Islamist penetration of the military in Libya, to pick one example of the unrest. I suspect that tribalism is far more important than theology. In Egypt, I suspect the regime has saved itself by buying time. Bahrain was more about Iranian influence on the Shiite population than Sunni jihadists at work. But just as the Iranians are trying to latch on to the process, so will the Sunni jihadists.
The Danger of Chaos
I suspect some regimes will fall, mostly reducing the country in question to chaos. The problem, as we are seeing in Tunisia, is that frequently there is no one on the revolutionaries’ side equipped to take power. The Bolsheviks had an organized party. In these revolutions, the parties are trying to organize themselves during the revolution, which is another way to say that the revolutionaries are in no position to govern. The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.
All of this is speculation. What we do know is that this is not the first wave of revolution in the world, and most waves fail, with their effects seen decades later in new regimes and political cultures. Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.
In the meantime, as you watch the region, remember not to watch the demonstrators. Watch the men with the guns. If they stand their ground for the state, the demonstrators have failed. If some come over, there is some chance of victory. And if victory comes, and democracy is declared, do not assume that what follows will in any way please the West — democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.
The situation remains fluid, and there are no broad certainties. It is a country-by-country matter now, with most regimes managing to stay in power to this point. There are three possibilities. One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades. The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance. The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.
If I were to guess at this point, I would guess that we are facing 1848. The Muslim world will not experience massive regime change as in 1989, but neither will the effects be as ephemeral as 1968. Like 1848, this revolution will fail to transform the Muslim world or even just the Arab world. But it will plant seeds that will germinate in the coming decades. I think those seeds will be democratic, but not necessarily liberal. In other words, the democracies that eventually arise will produce regimes that will take their bearings from their own culture, which means Islam.
The West celebrates democracy. It should be careful what it hopes for: It might get it.


Read more: Revolution and the Muslim World | STRATFOR 
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Monday, February 21, 2011

Keirin World Cup Final in Manchester

...incredible video, chapeau @Manolo_Saiz

Bahrain Grand Prix postponed race after protests

Next month’s season-opening grand prix in Bahrain has been called off, it was announced on Monday, ending days of feverish speculation.

Fate in his hands: Bernie Ecclestone held talks with the crown prince of Bahrain to discuss the implications of allowing the season opening race to go ahead given the protests and civil unrest in the country  Photo: REUTERS
Violent anti-government protests in the island kingdom had placed the race in grave doubt. And with teams, sponsors and drivers all privately expressing deep concerns about the image it would send out to go racing in a country still burying its dead, the sport's power brokers had little option but to cancel.
A statement from the race organisers confirmed the decision, stating somewhat ambiguously that “no decision has been made on a new date for the rescheduling of the race, which was due to take place from March 11th to 13th.”
Bahrain Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa said: "We felt it was important for the country to focus on immediate issues of national interest and leave the hosting of Bahrain's Formula One race to a later date," the prince said in a statement.
"After the events of the past week, our nation's priority is on overcoming tragedy, healing divisions and rediscovering the fabric that draws this country together; reminding the world of the very best that Bahrain is capable of as a nation once again united."
Telegraph Sport understands that the intention is to find a slot for the race at the end of the season, possibly after the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix in a rare triple-header with Brazil. Or with the season-ending Brazilian GP pushed back into December.
The commercial ramifications of the decision, which had caused the delay in the announcement to general consternation, are as yet unclear.
Ecclestone was insistent that the final decision should be down to Bahrain’s crown prince, although many feel that was because the country would then be liable to pay out the race fee of $40 million.
Bahrain was also thought to be paying an extra $20 million for the privilege of hosting the curtain raiser.
No doubt this will all form part of the ongoing negotiations to find a slot for the race later in the year.
Following this afternoon's decision, Ecclestone said: "It is sad that Bahrain has had to withdraw from the race, we wish the whole nation well as they begin to heal their country.
"The hospitality and warmth of the people of Bahrain is a hallmark of the race there, as anyone who has been at a Bahrain Grand Prix will testify. We look forward to being back in Bahrain soon."